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The Plain View Doctrine In Nebraska
State v. Holloman, 197 Neb. 139, 248 N.W.2d 15 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution establishes a prefer-
ence for searches under warrant.' There are, however, constitu-
tionally recognized exceptions to this requirement.2 The most
recent of these exceptions is the "plain view" doctrine.3 Under this
doctrine, a law enforcement officer's seizure of objects does not
constitute a "search" for purposes of the fourth amendment's pro-
hibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" when the of-
ficer, after a prior valid intrusion, inadvertently views an object
1. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948).
This was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (object in
plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circum-
stances); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (search incident
to a lawful arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (auto-
mobile search).
3. Although the roots of the plain view doctrine can be traced as far back
as the cases of Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); and Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924), it was not until Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), that the doctrine was formally enunciated by the Supreme
Court. Part IIC of Mr. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge,
id. at 464-73, is now generally considered as having established the
basic test for applying the plain view doctrine. There is, however,
a certain amount of disagreement on this point as Part IIC was fully
concurred in by only three other Justices. See, e.g., Moylan, The
Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Inci-
dent" Geography Battle, 26 MERcER L. R-V. 1047, 1048-49 (1975). For
the purposes of this article it will be assumed that Mr. Justice Stew-
art's opinion in Coolidge is the "law of the land" with respect to the
plain view doctrine.
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immediately apparent as evidence. 4 Rather, the seizure is held as
having come about as the result of a mere observation. State v.
Holloman5 is the most recent Nebraska case dealing with the plain
view doctrine. This article will deal with the Holloman decision
in relation to the requirement of the plain view doctrine that an
object be "immediately apparent" as evidence.
II. THE FACTS OF HOLLOMAN
Early in the morning of April 20, 1975, a 76 year-old woman
was forcibly raped in her Omaha home, and afterwards robbed of
$20 by her assailant.6 That same morning Officer Hunt, the police
officer assigned to investigate the crime, received from the victim
a general description of the assailant. Officer Hunt then inspected
the premises and found that the rear door of the victim's residence
had been forcibly entered. In the damp ground outside the door
were several heel and foot prints. 7  Later that morning, the
investigation led Officer Hunt and another policeman, Officer
Keavy, to the defendant's residence. After knocking on the defend-
ant's door for several minutes, the defendant appeared and let the
officers in. The officers identified themselves. After being advised
that he was a possible suspect in a rape case, the defendant agreed
to accompany the officers to the police station, but stated that he
first had to get dressed. "While the defendant was getting dressed,
Officer Hunt observed several pair of shoes lying on the floor next
to where the defendant was."" The officer picked the shoes up and
observed that the heels on one of the pairs had a design similar
to the prints he had earlier seen behind the victim's home." The
shoes were then seized as evidence. Officer Keavy then observed
a sweater on a chair next to the defendant's bed which matched
the description of the one worn by the assailant. This sweater was
also seized.1 0 The defendant was then taken to the police station,
where he was arrested. At trial, the defendant was convicted of
forcible rape and robbery." One of the grounds upon which the
defendant appealed was
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
5. 197 Neb. 139, 248 N.W.2d 15 (1976).
6. Id. at 140, 248 N.W.2d at 17.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 141, 248 N.W.2d at 17.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 142, 248 N.W.2d at 17.
11. Id. at 140, 248 N.W.2d at 17.
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that the District Court committed reversible error in overruling
his pretrial motion to suppress, from -use against him at trial,
evidence of the impression of the bottom of the heel of one of his
shoes and a blue sweater, which he claims were seized in violation
of his constitutional rights. 12
The court justified the police officers' seizure of these items under
the plain view doctrine.
III. ANALYSIS
Before a seizure may be justified under the plain view doctrine,
three conditions must be met.13 The first two conditions are: (1)
the police officer must have a prior justification for the intrusion,
and (2) in the course of the intrusion he must inadvertently come
across the piece of evidence incriminating the accused.14 These two
conditions would appear to be met in the instant case.1 5 The third
12. Id.
13. See Moylan, supra note 3, at 1073-88.
14. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466.
15. Coolidge stated the first two requirements of the plain view doctrine
as follows:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being pres-
ent unconnected with a search directed against the accused-
and permits the warrantless seizure.
Id.
Thus, the first hurdle that must be cleared before evidence may
be -admitted at trial under the plain view doctrine is the existence of
a prior valid intrusion by the police. See, e.g., United States v. Gard-
ner, 537 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1976), wherein evidence was held inadmis-
sible on the ground that the officer obtained entry by means of an
invalid search warrant. The Supreme Court in Coolidge gave ex-
amples of four situations in which a police officer's prior intrusion
would be valid for purposes of applying the plain view doctrine: (1)
when police acting under a valid search warrant "come across some
other article of incriminating character," (2) when the initial intrusion
is without warrant, but is supported by one of the recognized excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, (3) during a search incident to a
lawful arrest, and (4) "where a police officer is not searching for evi-
dence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object." 403 U.S. at 465-66. For a discussion of the
application of each situation, see Moylan, supra note 3, at 1072-78.
In Holloman, the entry of the police officer was apparently justified
under the fourth situation, on the ground that it was consented to by
the defendant. Defendant's brief, however, argued that, "[t]he most
that can be said from a reading of the entire record is that the defend-
212 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
requirement of the plain view doctrine was stated in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire as follows:
Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges.1 6
ant silently acquiesced in the police entry, searches, and seizures," and
"that such consent was insufficient to justify the police officers' ac-
tions." Brief for Appellant at 16-18. The Nebraska Supreme Court
dismissed this argument however:
It is clear under the facts of this case that the police officers
had a "right to be in the position to have [the] view. .. "
The defendant was a suspect in a rape and robbery case. He
had been positively identified by the victim as her assailant.
He lived next door to the rape victim. After the officers
knocked on the defendant's door, and identified themselves as
police officers, they were let in by the defendant. The de-
fendant agreed to accompany them to the police station for
questioning after he first dressed. The record is devoid of any
objection by the defendant to the presence of the officers in
his apartment while he dressed.
197 Neb. at 142-43, 248 N.W.2d at 18 (citation omitted).
The purpose of the inadvertence requirement is to prevent police
officers from taking contrived or anticipated "plain views":
The evil at which this requirement is aimed is the "planned
warrantless seizure." The "inadvertence" requirement is in-
tended simply to prevent the police from using an entry into
a "constitutionally protected area' for purposes of making an
arrest-or for any other ostensibly legitimate purpose-as a
mere subterfuge for a plain view reconnoitering. There may
not be a contrived investigatory reconnaissance aimed at
evading the warrant requirement for a search or seizure.
There may not be a planned plain view.
Moylan, supra note 3, at 1083-84. Notably, it was this requirement
of the plain view doctrine which largely sparked the dissenting opin-
ions in Coolidge of Justices Black, 403 U.S. at 505-10 (Black, J., con-
curring and dissenting), and White, id. at 513-22 (White, J., concurring
and dissenting). The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision that this re-
quirement was met appears to be correct. There was no evidence
that the officers entered the defendant's residence for any purpose
other than that of taking him to the police station for questioning.
16. 403 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has stressed the constitutional
disfavor for general exploratory searches, stating that the fourth
amendment
emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general searches.
Since before the creation of our government, such searches
have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of
liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions or statutes
of every State in the Union. . . . The need of protection
against them is attested alike by history and present condi-
tions. The Amendment is to be liberally construed and all
owe the duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement lest
there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of
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The decision in Holloman must be carefully scrutinized in relation
to this requirement that the incriminating character of the object
be immediately apparent.
The court in Holloman recognized the difficulty of justifying the
seizure under the plain view doctrine when it stated:
The real question in this case is whether or not Officer Hunt's
actions in picking up several pair of the defendant's shoes and ex-
amining the heels went beyond the "plain view" doctrine and con-
stituted an unconstitutional search and seizure.
... While the shoes themselves were clearly in plain view, the
heels could not have been observed without Officer Hunt taking
the action that he did.1
Thus, the court accurately identified the two overt acts involved
in the case which arguably extended the officer's actions beyond
the realm of mere observation of immediately apparent evidence.
First, before the shoes were seized they were picked up and turned
over so as to allow the police officer to view their heel marks.
Second, the shoes were lying among several other pair of shoes at
the time of their seizure.1
8
In considering any question arising under the fourth amend-
ment, it is important not to lose sight of that amendment's funda-
mental guarantee:
[T]he rule [is] that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound
than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon.19
which it was adopted.
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (cita-
tions omitted).
17. 197 Neb. at 143, 248 N.W.2d at 18 (emphasis added). The seizure of
defendant's sweater does not seem to raise difficulties similar to those
involved in the seizure of the shoes, and therefore will not be dis-
cussed. Unlike the shoes, as soon as the officer observed the sweater
he could ascertain that it matched the description of that worn by the
assailant. Id. Thus, it was not necessary for the sweater to be picked
up for its incriminating character to be revealed.
18. Clearly, once Officer Hunt had picked up and turned over the shoes,
it was apparent to him that they were evidence. The plain view doc-
trine, however, cuts in at an earlier point in time, namely, at the time
Officer Hunt saw the shoes. Just as a search cannot be made legal
by what it turns up, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963),
a plain view seizure cannot be justified upon the ground that the ob-ject subsequently turned out to be evidence.
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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The sentiments of this guarantee were discussed in Gouled v.
United States, 20 in referring to both the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. The Supreme Court stated: "It has been repeatedly
decided that these Amendments should receive a liberal construc-
tion, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual
depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible prac-
tice of courts or by well-intended but mistakenly over-zealous
executive officers."'2 1 Thus, the "few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions" 22 to the fourth amendment, having
been "jealously and carefully drawn, '23 are to receive a narrow con-
struction, while the amendment itself must receive an expansive
one.
Coolidge held the plain view doctrine applicable only in certain
limited circumstances. In so doing, the Court "manifested a clear
purpose of narrow construction and strict application of the plain
view exception. '2 4 Unfortunately, by its decision in Holloman, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has not followed the lead of the United
States Supreme Court.
The court in Holloman justified the seizure of the shoes on the
grounds that, "[t] he defendant's shoes were in plain view. Officer
Hunt's actions under the circumstances clearly were not unreason-
able. '2 5 As a basis for this conclusion, the court relied upon Harris
v. United States,2 6 to the effect that, "[iit has long been settled
that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be introduced in evidence. '27
The court, however, possibly seduced by the rather indiscrim-
inate use in Harris of the phrase "plain view," overlooked the
simple fact that not every "open view" constitutes a "plain view"
for purposes of the plain view doctrine. 28 In Harris, the petitioner's
20. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
21. Id. at 304.
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
23. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
24. Comment, "Plain View"--Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the
Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 489, 515 (1974).
25. 197 Neb. at 144, 248 N.W.2d at 19.
26. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
27. Id. at 236 (quoted in State v. Holloman, 197 Neb. at 142, 248 N.W.2d at
17).
28. Moylan, supra note 3, at 1096. Coolidge stated this proposition as
follows:
It is well established that under certain circumstances the
police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.
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car had been seen leaving the scene of a robbery. Petitioner was
arrested, and his car was impounded as evidence and towed to the
police station. There it was searched by a police officer pursuant
to a police department regulation.29 After the search was com-
pleted, the officer opened the front door on the passenger side to
roll up the window and lock the door. When he opened the door,
he "saw the registration card which lay face up on 'the metal
stripping over which the door closes. '30  Thus, upon opening the
door it was possible for the officer to determine that the card was
evidence merely by looking at it. The Supreme Court held that
the card was properly seized and admitted at trial.3 1
It is to be noted that Harris did not involve a situation in which
a law enforcement officer physically manipulated an object in order
to discover its incriminating nature, and thus the Supreme Court's
holding does not address itself to that point. The Court only
pointed out facts indicating that upon the law enforcement officer's
mere viewing of the registration card, its incriminating character
was immediately apparent. The theory behind the plain view doc-
trine is that an officer who inadvertently sees evidence or the fruits
of a crime should not be required to turn his head and pretend
he didn't see it. 32 To read Harris as allowing an officer who views
But it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority
of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain
view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with
the "plain view" doctrine has been to identify the circum-
stances in which plain view has legal significance rather than
being simply the normal concomitant of any search, legal or
illegal.
403 U.S. at 465 (emphasis in original).
29. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. at 235.
30. Id. at 235-36 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 236. A similar case is United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
In that case, a Coast Guard patrol boat approached a schooner 24 miles
off the United States coast at night. Upon nearing the schooner, the
patrol discovered a motor boat alongside the schooner. A searchlight
shined on the motor boat revealed several cases of contraband liquor
on its deck. Id. at 563. The Court held that the Coast Guard's action
did not violate the Constitution, stating:
[N] o search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the
boatswain shows that he used a searchlight. It is not shown
that there was any exploration below decks or under hatches.
For aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck and
• . . were discovered before the motor boat was boarded.
Id. Thus, in Lee, as in Harris, it would appear that the mere observa-
tion of the object by the law enforcement officer immediately revealed
its incriminating nature, without necessitating picking it up and turn-
ing it over.
32. "Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police in-
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what he suspects might be evidence to pick the object up and
thoroughly examine it for the purpose of revealing its incriminat-
ing character does not seem to be in keeping with either the pur-
pose of this exception or the construction of the fourth amendment
in general.
Mr. Justice Stewart perhaps best focused upon the limitations
of Harris in his concurring opinion in Stanley v. Georgia,33 cited
with approval in Coolidge. 4 State and federal agents entered peti-
tioner's house pursuant to a search warrant authorizing them to
search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity. In petitioner's
bedroom, three reels of film were discovered.3 5 Using a projector
and screen, which were found in the living room, these films were
viewed and seized by the state officers. Petitioner was subse-
quently arrested and convicted under Georgia law for knowingly
possessing obscene matter.3 6 The majority disposed of the case on
the grounds that, "the mere private possession of obscene matter
cannot constitutionally be made a crime. '3 7 Mr. Justice Stewart,
however, in an opinion concurred in by Justices Brennan and White,
argued that the case should have been decided upon fourth amend-
ment grounds .3  After finding that the agents had legitimately en-
tered petitioner's bedroom, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that the war-
rant gave the agents no authority to seize the films:
This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search
came upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in
plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of the
films could not be determined by mere inspection .... After find-
ing them, the agents spent some 50 minutes exhibiting them by
advertently come upon a piece of evidence, it woild be a needless in-
convenience, and sometimes dangerous-to require them to ignore it
until they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
33. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
34. 403 U.S. at 465, 467.
35. 394 U.S. at 558.
36. Id. at 558-59.
37. Id. at 559.
38. In affirming the appellant's conviction, the Georgia Supreme
Court specifically determined that the films had been lawfully
seized. The appellant correctly contends that this determina-
tion was clearly wrong under established principles of consti-
tutional law. But the Court today disregards this preliminary
issue in its hurry to move on to newer constitutional frontiers.
I cannot so readily overlook the serious inroads upon Fourth
Amendment guarantees countenanced in this case by the
Georgia courts.
Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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means of the appellant's projector in another upstairs room. Only
then did the agents return downstairs and arrest the appellant.39
Thus, although the officers during the course of their search
observed in plain view three reels of film, their incriminating
nature was not immediately apparent and could be determined only
upon further physical examination. In this respect, Stanley is very
similar to Holloman.
In Holloman, the court recognized the fact that it was only after
Officer Hunt had physically manipulated the shoes that their in-
criminating nature became apparent.40 Nothing in the court's de-
cision in Holloman overcomes this difficulty. The constitutional re-
quirement is that the object be "immediately apparent" as evidence.
Not only were the heels not visible until the shoes were picked
up and turned over, but there were also several pairs of shoes that
had to be examined.4 1 Undoubtedly, the fact, standing alone, that
there were several pairs of shoes would not move Officer Hunt's
actions into the realm of a "search." Further, the mere fact that
there were numerous shoes lying together does not preclude the
application of the plain view exception, if the viewing officer could
identify those shoes constituting evidence by mere observation. In
this case, however, it was necessary for the officer to pick up and
turn over the shoes before he could make such a determination.
42
This, combined with the fact that there were several pairs of shoes
present and that Officer Hunt picked up and examined most, if
not all, of these shoes, further emphasizes the fact that until the
shoes were moved nothing about them was immediately apparent
as being incriminating. Furthermore, it seems obvious that Officer
Hunt's only purpose for his action was to pursue his suspicion that
a shoe with a heel print matching those on the ground outside the
victim's door might be among the shoes.
A certain amount of disagreement among the courts has cen-
tered around just how "immediately apparent" an object must be
as evidence before its seizure is justified. "The standard has ranged
from mere suspicion to probable cause to virtual certainty that an
item has evidentiary value. '43 While this question is still unsettled,
the general trend is apparently moving towards requiring the police
39. Id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
40. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
41. State v. Holloman, 197 Neb. at 141, 248 N.W.2d at 17.
42. Id. at 143, 248 N.W.2d at 18.
43. Comment, supra note 24, at 502.
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officer to have at least probable cause for the seizure, as that is the
requirement for the issuance of a search warrant. Unfortunately,
the court in Holloman has apparently opted for the least stringent
of the three standards-that of suspicion.
In support of its position that the police officer was not acting
unreasonably in scrutinizing the shoes more carefully by lifting
them and turning them over,44 the court cited United States v.
Catanzaro.45 Catanzaro involved a situation in which a postal in-
spector, lawfully inside the defendant's apartment to investigate his
alleged fraudulent use of credit cards, noticed a rifle on a wall rack
and recalled some repair work done on a rifle of similar descrip-
tion which was paid for by credit card. The inspector observed
that the serial number of the rifle matched that of the one
whose repair work was paid for by way of a fraudulently used
credit card and seized the rifle as evidence. 6 The court in
Holloman quoted with approval the following language from
Cantanzaro: "The inspector was not precluded from observing what
was clearly and plainly to be seen. Having seen the rifle, the in-
spector properly scrutinized it more carefully, thereby confirming
his suspicions that it was part of the fruit of the alleged crime. ' 47
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Shipman v. State,48 pointed out
the consequences of allowing a seizure under the plain view doc-
trine based upon less than probable cause. Shipman involved a
case in which a police officer, after stopping a car, observed an
occupant shift some cellophane bags from one hand to another, and
then conceal them in the top of his boot.49 The court held that
the seizure of the bags was not justifiable under the plain view
doctrine, 50 as the proper standard was probable cause, and the of-
ficer, at the time of the seizure, was acting upon suspicion. In so
doing, the court emphasized the result of using a standard of less
than probable cause:
The reason for this rule is apparent. If the rule were otherwise,
an officer, acting on mere groundless suspicion, could seize any-
thing and everything belonging to an individual which happened
44. 197 Neb. at 144, 248 N.W.2d at 19.
45. 282 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. Id. at 69.
47. Id. at 69-70 (quoted in State v. Holloman, 197 Neb. at 144, 248 N.W.2d
at 18) (emphasis added).
48. 291 Ala. 484, 282 So. 2d 700 (1973).
49. The facts of the case are set out in Shipman v. State, 51 Ala. App.
80, 282 So. 2d 696 (1973).
50. 291 Ala. at 488, 282 So. 2d at 704.
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to be in plain view on the prospect that on further investigation
some of it might prove to have been stolen or to be contraband.
It would open the door to unreasonable confiscation of a person's
property while a minute examination of it is made in an effort to
find something criminal. 51
By utilizing suspicion as the test of when an object is immedi-
ately apparent as evidence, the court in Holloman reached precisely
the type of result which the Shipman court had feared. The deci-
sion in Holloman would further seem to have clearly violated
Justice Stewart's caveat in Coolidge that "the plain view doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges."3' '
It is difficult to find any factors in Holloman justifying the
court's use of the "suspicion" requirement. At the time of the
seizure, the defendant had not been arrested, but had merely been
asked to accompany the officers to the police station for question-
ing.53 While the exigencies of a particular situation may justify
police action based on less than probable cause,54 in the present
case the police officers were in no danger, and the potential
evidence was in no apparent danger of being moved or destroyed.
Thus, any delay resulting from requiring the officers to obtain a
search warrant would seem to have been of little consequence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the correctness of the court's decision, Holloman
is presently the rule in Nebraska with respect to the "immediately
apparent" requirement of the plain view doctrine. That rule, ap-
parently, is that when an officer views an object which he suspects
might be evidence, or a number of objects one of which he suspects
might be evidence, he may physically examine the object or objects
for the purpose of revealing incriminating characteristics.
By allowing the defendant's shoes to be introduced at trial, the
court has greatly expanded the potential for application of the plain
view doctrine, arguably extending its scope beyond the boundaries
established by the United States Supreme Court. In so doing, the
51. Id.
52. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466.
53. 197 Neb. at 141, 248 N.W.2d at 17.
54. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
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court has come dangerously close to violating the spirit of the con-
stitutional proscription of general exploratory searches. The deci-
sion in Holloman serves to emphasize the importance of closely ad-
hering to the "immediately apparent" requirement of the plain view
doctrine.
Richard Birch '78
